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Research

Hebron Protocol

We can explain why Hebron matters without overstating its broader success.

The Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron was signed on January 17, 1997 by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, with Secretary of State Warren Christopher as witness for the United States. It was the first major implementation of the Oslo II framework under a Likud government, and it covered the most politically fraught city in the West Bank: Hebron, home to both a significant Palestinian population of roughly 120,000 at the time and a small but strategically placed Jewish community of several hundred residents living in proximity to the Tomb of the Patriarchs / Ibrahimi Mosque.

Why Hebron was uniquely difficult

Hebron is the only West Bank city where Israeli settlers live inside the city itself rather than in a separate settlement bloc. The Tomb of the Patriarchs, where tradition places the burial of Abraham, Sarah, Isaac, Rebecca, Jacob, and Leah, is sacred to both Jews and Muslims. The 1994 Goldstein massacre, in which an Israeli settler killed 29 Palestinian worshippers at the Ibrahimi Mosque, had left deep scars. Redeployment from the rest of the West Bank under Oslo II had included Hebron in principle, but the practical arrangements had been deferred because of the city’s unique configuration. The protocol resolved that deferral.

H-1 and H-2

The protocol divided the municipality into two sectors. H-1 comprised roughly 80 percent of the city’s area, contained approximately 100,000 Palestinians, and was transferred to full Palestinian civil and security control, equivalent to Area A status. H-2 comprised the remaining roughly 20 percent of the city, including the historic old city, the Tomb of the Patriarchs, and the Jewish community of roughly 500 residents, along with approximately 30,000 Palestinian residents. In H-2, Israel retained security control while Palestinian civil authority applied to Palestinian residents. The State Department’s archival record notes that the protocol was accompanied by a Note for the Record drawn up by Ambassador Dennis Ross that captured reciprocal commitments on further redeployments, safe passage, the Palestinian Covenant, and prevention of incitement.

The Temporary International Presence in Hebron

The protocol also reestablished the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), a civilian observer mission contributed by Norway, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. TIPH operated from 1997 until January 2019, when Prime Minister Netanyahu declined to renew its mandate. Its reports over two decades documented daily friction, though they were circulated only to the parties and did not carry enforcement authority.

What the protocol implemented from Oslo II

The Hebron Protocol was an implementation document, not a new framework. It activated provisions of Oslo II that had been deferred, but it also negotiated modifications in recognition of Hebron’s unique situation, including the retention of Israeli security control in H-2 and specific arrangements for access to holy sites. The protocol was ratified by the Israeli Cabinet by a vote of 11 to 7 and by the Knesset on January 16, 1997 by a vote of 87 to 17, demonstrating that even a Likud-led government could command a parliamentary majority for implementing Oslo-era commitments.

Why it mattered

Hebron mattered for three reasons. First, it showed that Netanyahu, who had campaigned against Oslo II, was willing to implement its provisions under the right political conditions. Second, it demonstrated that Israel could negotiate and execute redeployment in the single most symbolically freighted city in the conflict. Third, it created the H-1/H-2 structure that still exists today, which, whatever its shortcomings, has allowed two populations with intensely conflicting claims to share a city without returning to the conditions of the early 1990s. The protocol did not rescue the broader peace process. The Oslo track continued to slow, then stall, then collapse into the Second Intifada. But Hebron remains a documented case of negotiated territorial redeployment under unusually difficult conditions, and it belongs in any honest accounting of the land-for-peace record.