The Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, signed in Washington on March 26, 1979 by President Anwar Sadat, Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and President Jimmy Carter as witness, is the single most consequential achievement in the “land for peace” record. It followed thirteen days of negotiations at Camp David in September 1978 that produced two framework agreements, one on the future of the Sinai and Egypt-Israel relations, and a second, broader framework on the West Bank and Gaza that went largely unfulfilled. The treaty itself translated the first framework into binding obligations.
What Israel gave up
Israel agreed to withdraw fully from the Sinai Peninsula, a territory of roughly 61,000 square kilometers that Israeli forces had held since the 1967 Six-Day War. The withdrawal was phased over three years and completed in April 1982. Israel dismantled its settlements in the Sinai, including the town of Yamit, whose evacuation was politically traumatic. It also relinquished the Alma and Abu Rudeis oil fields, which at the time supplied a significant portion of Israeli domestic consumption, as well as the airbases of Eitam, Etzion, and Ophir.
What Egypt gave in return
Egypt recognized Israel, established full diplomatic relations, opened the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping, and committed to “normal relations” including trade, tourism, and the free movement of people and goods. In Article III of the treaty, both parties undertook to “recognize and will respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence” and to “refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly” against the other. Egypt also agreed to the demilitarization provisions of Annex I, which limit forces and armaments in defined zones across the Sinai.
Security architecture
The treaty is enforced through a layered security regime. The Sinai is divided into zones A, B, and C with progressively restrictive limits on Egyptian military forces, and a narrow zone D on the Israeli side with limits on Israeli forces. Compliance is monitored by the Multinational Force and Observers, an independent peacekeeping body stood up in 1981 after the Soviet Union blocked a UN mission. The United States is the largest contributor. The MFO has operated continuously since 1982 and is, by any reasonable measure, one of the most successful peacekeeping operations in the modern era. The Office of the Historian at the State Department treats the treaty as the founding accomplishment of modern American Middle East diplomacy.
Why the treaty endured
Four factors explain the durability. First, Egypt under Sadat had made a strategic decision to exit the Arab-Israeli war system and reorient toward the United States, and that strategic decision survived his 1981 assassination. Second, the American security relationship with Egypt, including roughly $1.3 billion per year in military aid, created a material stake in the treaty’s survival. Third, the demilitarization architecture removed the tactical temptations that had driven earlier wars. Fourth, no Egyptian government has had a credible interest in reopening the Sinai front, even governments publicly hostile to Israel. Council on Foreign Relations analysis notes that the treaty held through the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the brief Muslim Brotherhood presidency of Mohamed Morsi in 2012-2013, and the el-Sisi restoration.
What “cold peace” means and does not mean
Honest advocacy requires acknowledging that the Egypt-Israel peace has never warmed into a Franco-German style reconciliation. Egyptian public opinion remains hostile to normalization, professional syndicates discourage cultural and academic exchange, and trade volumes are modest relative to the size of both economies. But “cold peace” is not the same as no peace. The Egyptian army does not prepare to fight Israel. Egyptian intelligence cooperates closely with Israeli intelligence on Sinai counterterrorism and Gaza border management. Egyptian mediators negotiated the October 2023 hostage deals. When Israel needs a serious interlocutor in the Arab world, Egypt picks up the phone. The benchmark for this treaty is not warmth. It is the absence of war on a frontier that had produced four major wars in twenty-five years. By that benchmark, the treaty is a historic success and the strongest existing proof that “land for peace” can work when the state counterparty is stable, capable, and committed.