The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, commonly called Oslo II or the Taba Agreement, was signed in Washington on September 28, 1995 by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, with Jordan, Egypt, Russia, and the United States as witnesses. It was the most detailed and ambitious agreement of the entire Oslo process. At more than 300 pages with seven annexes, it established the operational structure of Palestinian self-government, redrew the map of security control across the West Bank, and set the mechanics for the elections that brought the Palestinian Legislative Council and the presidency of Yasser Arafat into being in January 1996. The full text is archived in the UN Peacemaker database and at the Avalon Project.
The Area A, B, and C division
The agreement’s most lasting innovation was the tripartite division of the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C, described in Article XI and the detailed maps of Annex I. Area A placed major Palestinian population centers, beginning with Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, under full Palestinian civil and security control. Area B covered most other Palestinian towns and villages, about 450 in total, and placed them under Palestinian civil authority with shared Israeli-Palestinian security responsibility, with Israel retaining “overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.” Area C covered the remainder of the West Bank, including all Israeli settlements, most of the Jordan valley, and the roads connecting settlements, and kept it under full Israeli civil and security control pending final status negotiations. The agreement was designed so that Area A and B would expand through further redeployments. At initial implementation, Area A was roughly 3 percent of the West Bank, Area B roughly 24 percent, and Area C roughly 73 percent.
What the agreement delivered
The agreement transferred forty spheres of civil authority, from education and health to taxation, to the new Palestinian Authority. Chapter 2 provided for the Palestinian Legislative Council, an 88-seat elected body, and the direct election of the Ra’ees (president) of the Executive Authority. Chapter 3 built the legal framework for Palestinian courts, though it preserved Israeli jurisdiction over Israeli citizens in the territories. Chapter 5 defined the structure of Palestinian security forces, initially capped at 30,000 personnel across six services, and set the cooperation mechanism with the Israeli security establishment, including the District Coordination Offices (DCOs) that still operate today. Article XXXI contained mutual commitments that neither party would “initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.”
Why it matters for land for peace
Oslo II is arguably the strongest evidence in the entire record that Israel was willing to engage in concrete territorial redeployment and transfer of authority under a negotiated framework. Within eighteen months of signing, the Israel Defense Forces withdrew from six major West Bank cities, dismantled military government infrastructure, and handed responsibility for roughly a quarter of the Palestinian population to a brand-new Palestinian governing authority. Britannica’s entry on the Interim Agreement describes it as “the most far-reaching transfer of authority in the history of the Israeli occupation.” The Office of the Historian at the State Department treats it as the operational centerpiece of the Oslo process.
Why the interim became permanent
Oslo II was explicitly designed as a transitional arrangement, with Article XXXI(7) committing both parties to reach a permanent settlement within five years. That permanent settlement never arrived. The Rabin assassination in November 1995, the Netanyahu victory in the 1996 election, the Hebron Protocol and Wye River Memorandum slowdowns, the failed Camp David 2000 summit, and the Second Intifada in 2000-2005 each extended the “interim” period. As of 2026, the Area A/B/C structure persists. Area C remains under Israeli control, settlements have expanded, and the Palestinian Authority operates in Area A and parts of Area B. The interim framework has outlasted the political leaders who signed it.
What Oslo II proves and does not prove
Oslo II proves that Israel signed a detailed, operational, territorially specific agreement that transferred control over Palestinian population centers to a Palestinian authority, and then implemented it. It does not prove that the interim structure is a good long-term outcome for either party. It does not prove that the Palestinian Authority, as stood up by this agreement, had the institutional capacity to carry the weight of governance under the security pressures that followed. Honest advocacy treats Oslo II as a documented concession that did not reach its intended destination.